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Nontraditional War

Russia’s Frozen Conflicts and the Donbas
Erik J. Grossman
©2018 Erik J. Grossman

ABSTRACT: This article describes the evolution of Russia’s use of
unconventional warfare within regions that have large populations
of ethnic Russians. The purpose of Russian unconventional warfare
is usually to counter the growth of Western alliances in the region
within the boundaries of international law.

T

he Kremlin has long used frozen conflicts to extend their reach
beyond Russian borders. In Moldova, Russia has backed the proRussian regime in the breakaway region of Transdniestria since
1992. In 2008, Georgia faced a conventional Russian invasion in support
of the separatist governments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In 2014,
Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine and began supporting an insurgency
of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas. Analysis of these conflicts
reveals the Kremlin’s growing understanding of frozen conflicts and
the opportunities they present to achieve global and regional objectives.
Despite this knowledge, however, Russia’s attempts to foment and to
exploit a frozen conflict in the Donbas have been a failure.
This article analyzes Russia’s legacy of frozen conflicts and Vladimir
Putin’s use of them, including the Transdniestria conflict in Moldova,
the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008, and the Donbas insurgency.
After examining the Donbas insurgency. The article concludes with
policy recommendations for the Ukrainian and Western governments.

Legacy of Frozen Conflicts

Armed conflicts that have ended via a cease-fire, whether de facto
or de jure, but not a peace treaty, are considered frozen. Taken as a
region, the post-Soviet space seems perfectly ripe for the creation of
frozen conflicts as they boast “ethnic minorities that are large enough
to hope for their own statehood,” separatist sentiment, and societal divisions an external actor can exploit. 1 Post-Soviet successor states were
left in control of large minorities who had been shuffled around over
decades of Soviet-induced migration, and the evaporation of central
authority renewed many long-suppressed religious, ethnic, and territorial
divisions. This gives Russia, a revisionist power, the local knowledge,
influence, and circumstances to foment separatism and exploit frozen
conflicts on its periphery.
It is understandable that Russia would seek to freeze these conflicts.
The feeling in Vladimir Putin’s Moscow is that Russia lost its rightful
empire with the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, statists such as
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1      Nadezhda Arbatova, “Frozen Conflicts and European Security,” Security Index 16, no. 3 Department Office of
Public Affairs.
(September 10, 2010): 51.
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Putin have been forced to watch these newly independent nations turn
away from Russia and towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU). Thus, frozen conflicts are
a solution to the problem of creeping Western influence in the postSoviet space. Russia might not be able to bring these states back under
Moscow’s control wholesale, but it can effectively siphon off pieces to
the Kremlin’s benefit.
First, freezing a conflict retains at least some of the buffer zone
that is central to Russian identity and strategy. Russia is a country
steeped in tradition that includes a 700-year legacy of foreign powers
marching across the flatlands of the European plains and central Asian
steppes, burning and pillaging as they advance on Moscow. With no
geographical barriers or impediments to an enemy, aside from “General
Winter,” Russia has consistently sought to expand and to maintain a
barrier around its heartland. As Robert D. Kaplan writes, “Land powers
are perennially insecure. . . . Without seas to protect them, they are
forever dissatisfied and have to keep expanding or be conquered in turn
themselves. This is especially true of the Russians, whose flat expanse is
almost bereft of natural borders and affords little protection.” 2
Second, suspending the fight immediately halts Western integration
in the affected state since NATO and the European Union are unwilling
to challenge a Russian military response.3 This aversion was most evident
following the Georgian conflict.
Third, the pause provides Russia an opportunity for further
infiltrating local governments and economies by acting “as engines for
corruption and criminality, and as Trojan horses to block progress.” 4
This corruption is often used as an avenue for money laundering by
Russian elites and Putin’s allies, most notably in Moldova. In another
act of economic corruption, frozen conflicts allow Russia to support
its key energy exports by gaining control over “major energy pipeline
routes, often at key junctures in pipeline networks” and exert political
pressure over the affected countries who are forced to purchase Russian
gas.5 Many of these pipelines are the product of Soviet investment, and
therefore viewed by the Kremlin as Russia’s rightful property.
Fourth, frozen conflicts allow Russia to establish a forward presence
of armed forces, such as the roughly 9,000 troops currently maintained
across South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria as well as additional
GRU and Spetsnaz forces deployed in the Donbas.6 These forward
troops provide the same sort of deterrence as the trip wire of NATO
forces in Europe and extend the immediate reach of the Moscow’s
intelligence services. Furthermore, the presence of Russian troops in
2      Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the
Battle against Fate (New York: Random House, 2013), 155.
3      Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Russia-NATO Mistrust: Ethnophobia and the Double Expansion
to Contain ‘the Russian Bear,’ ” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, no. 1 (March 2013): 186.
4      Robert Ottung and Christopher Walker, “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts,” Foreign Policy, February
13, 2015.
5      John R. Haines, “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Networked Energy Infrastructure,” Orbis 59,
no. 4 (Fall 2015): 558.
6      Joshua Kucera, “At Press Conference, Putin Forgets about Military Bases in Armenia,
Moldova, Abkhazia . . . ,” Eurasianet, December 18, 2014; and Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Special
Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas,” Parameters 46, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 18.
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nominally independent nations tacitly reinforces the narrative of Russia’s
regional dominance.
Finally, abeyance provides a platform for Putin to present himself
as a conflict mediator, a key player in international affairs, while
managing geopolitical alignment and democratization. By freezing
conflicts, Russia blunts democratic revolutions that might spill over its
borders. The Rose Revolution (2003) and Euromaidan demonstrations
(2013–14), for example, preceded Russian involvement in Georgia and
Ukraine, respectively.

Transdniestria, Moldova

Transdniestria, sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine, is de
jure a Moldovan enclave but is de facto an independent state. During the
waning days of the Soviet Union, Transdniestria declared independence
from Moldova, which was seeking closer cultural and political ties
with Romania. Romania had deposed its own communist government
through violent revolution in 1989 and was firmly aligning itself with the
West. Standing in contrast was Transdniestria, which was “Russophone,
industrialized, and the home of the 14th Soviet Army.” 7 Of particular
concern was a newly passed language law that declared Romanian as the
official state language and moved to extend its use in legal, cultural, and
educational spheres. This move frightened the Russified population of
Transdniestria who “viewed this shift away from Soviet (Russophone)
norms as ‘Romanianization,’ a phenomenon that threatened nonRomanian speakers with persecution, disenfranchisement, and death.” 8
This suppression of Russian culture therefore represents one of the
earliest cases of Russophobia, which the Kremlin views as an attack
on Russia as a civilization, and in turn demands a state response to
protect ethnic Russians. This is a concept Putin later employed to justify
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.
When the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic became independent
in 1991, it claimed sovereignty over the breakaway region. At the same
time, pro-Russian leaders in Transdniestria declared independence
from Moldova, which was confirmed in a plebiscite quickly followed by
presidential elections.9 Transdniestria had hoped to remain a federalized
part of the Soviet Union, but only weeks after its elections the Soviet
Union was dissolved. After several border skirmishes between Moldovan
police and Transdniestrian paramilitary forces, Moldova invaded and
captured the secessionist city of Bendery. The rebels were near collapse
when the 14th Army intervened and drove the Moldovan forces into
retreat. The following month, leaders negotiated a cease-fire with the
line serving as the de facto border between Transdniestria and Moldova.
Today, Russian, Transdniestrian, and Moldovan peacekeepers enforce
the arrangement. Russian political influence and financial support allows
the Transdniestrian government to function as a quasi-independent
state. Russia has also employed the favored tactic of passportization:
at least one-fifth of Transdniestrians hold Russian passports as do “the
7      Michael S. Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,”
Anthropology Today 30, no. 3 (June 2014): 4.
8      Bobick, “Separatism Redux,” 6.
9      Helge Blakkisrud and Pal Kolsto, “From Secessionist Conflict toward a Functioning State:
Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 2 (2011): 183.
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vast majority of Transnistrian state officials.” 10 Yet despite these close
ties, it seems Russia prefers to keep Transdniestria frozen rather than to
allow it to become formally independent. Russia may not be able to force
Moldova back into the fold, but freezing the Transdniestrian conflict
has weakened Moldovan sovereignty and frozen its western integration
for the past 25 years. This uncertainty has served to trap Moldova in a
geopolitical gray zone between East and West and forced it to act as a
vehicle for Russian corruption and money laundering.11

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, Part I

Like Moldova, Georgia’s two frozen conflicts came about during
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1989, South Ossetia demanded
to be acknowledged as an autonomous republic, and antigovernment
protests in Abkhazia began after Georgia attempted to open a branch
of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in the capital. Georgia
also introduced a language law that required “a Georgian language test
for entry into higher education,” instituted national holidays, created
military units comprised exclusively of native citizens, and promoted
“the resettlement of Georgians in areas dominated by minorities.” 12
Skirmishes between state forces and separatist militias began in late 1989.
The conflict escalated in 1991 when Georgia declared independence
from the Soviet Union in a referendum in which neither South Ossetia
nor Abkhazia participated. At this point, Russia takes a turn in its foreign
policy direction.
Initially, Soviet and Georgian troops cooperated to try to contain
and disarm militias in South Ossetia, but after the newly elected Georgian
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia refused to join the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) and refused to condemn the attempted
Soviet coup in 1991, he became persona non grata in the eyes of the
Kremlin.13 In June 1992, Russia started launching attacks on Georgian
military units and villages. After this intervention, Abkhazia declared
independence from Georgia and by the end of 1992, Gamsakhurdia’s
successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was negotiating a cease-fire with
Moscow. Later that year, a peacekeeping mission froze South Ossetia—
with Georgians, Russians, and South Ossetians acting as enforcers along
the cease-fire line.
The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict continued for two years. In that
time, three separate Russian-mediated cease-fires fell apart.14 Offensive
Abkhazian action, with Russian support, seizing territory and cities
from the Georgians, broke the third cease-fire. At the same time,
Georgia was beset by a “revival of the Zviadist rebellion [supporting
Gamsakhurdia] . . . threatening the complete collapse of the Georgian
state. At this stage (in October 1993), Shevardnadze flew to Moscow
and agreed that Georgia would join the Commonwealth of Independent
10      Bobick, “Separatism Redux,” 6.
11      Agnia Grigas, “Moldova: Stepping Out of Europe’s Grey Zone,” American Interest, March
9, 2018.
12      Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict, Confidence Building
Matters 6 (London: Verification Technology Information Centre, 1996), 10.
13      Sammut and Cvetkovski, Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict, 28.
14      S. Neil MacFarlane, “On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in
Georgia’s Civil Wars,” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 3 (September 1997): 513.
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States.” 15 Following Georgia’s ascension, Russia intervened to crush
Gamsakhurdia’s supporters and deploy troops along the line of contact.
By 1994, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was frozen with Russians,
Georgians, Abkhazians, and United Nations (UN) personnel acting as
peace enforcers.
The Georgian scenario has many similarities to the Moldovan
scenario. The implementation of language laws drastically increased
tensions. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria had all hoped
to remain a part of the Soviet Union or Russia, and turned to violence
when the country from which they separated declared the referendums
invalid. Like Transdniestria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were on the
losing side of a battle with state forces until Russia’s intervention, the
nature of which was also in part “a reflection of decisions made by independent-minded generals.” 16 These regions are also embroiled in
peace talks that have not presented Russia with any preferable alternative
to maintaining the status quo.
There are, however, key distinctions between these scenarios. Unlike
supporting the government of Moldova, Russia supported the Georgian
opposition leader to help launch a coup to oust the uncooperative
Gamsakhurdia. The increased involvement was due to three factors:
Georgia is more historically important to Russia than Moldova; Georgia
buffers Russian borders—as does South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which
also borders the Black Sea; and Gamsakhurdia’s active spurning of
Russia’s overtures for Georgia to become part of the federation. Many
in the Kremlin likely viewed this as a personal affront—former vassals
should not refuse the policy of a superpower.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, Part II

The Russian-Georgian war has been referred to as the product of a
security dilemma rather than overt Georgian or Russian ambitions. For
Georgia, the frozen conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia represented
an untenable source of insecurity and illegitimacy that drove Georgia
to become more secure by trying to resolve the issue.17 For Russia,
Georgia represented a peripheral strategic interest that was taking power
away from Moscow. Russia’s paranoia seemed justified after Georgia’s
Rose Revolution ended with the ousting of the Russian-compliant
Shevardnadze and the institution of democratic reforms. The new
government stated its goals as returning South Ossetia and Abkhazia
to Georgia and integrating more closely with the European Union. As
both sides implemented measures to secure their interests, neither could
accurately determine aggressive or defensive maneuvers by the other.18
The war started with either a Georgian offensive into South
Ossetia, South Ossetian terrorist attacks on Georgian forces, or Russian
military exercises that were merely screens for an invasion. The security
dilemma made a confrontation so likely that, for the purposes of this
article, the antagonist is inconsequential.19 Georgian forces captured the
15      MacFarlane, “On the Front Lines,” 514.
16      Sammut and Cvetkovski, Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict, 13.
17      Cory Welt, “The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004
Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 64–65.
18      Welt, “Thawing of a Frozen Conflict,” 65.
19      Welt, “Thawing of a Frozen Conflict,” 92–93.
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South Ossetian capital, and Russia responded with a combined arms
counteroffensive. As Russia pushed into Georgia, Abkhazian forces
opened a second front and attacked the Kodori valley. By the end of
the five-day campaign, Russia occupied numerous Georgian cities and
South Ossetians began cleansing Georgians from local villages. The
conflict ended with a cease-fire on August 12, 2008. Russia withdrew its
troops back into South Ossetia and Abkhazia in September, and formally
recognized these states as independent. In response to the war, the West
levied condemnations that were “firm in rhetoric but compromising
in reality.” 20
Russia’s objectives were as much regional as they were global. Russia
had invested a considerable amount of political and military resources
in the region such as staffing the local government with ethnic Russians
and the passportization of the populace, which made them official
Russian citizens.21 Globally, Russia was facing a crisis. Between 2004
and 2008, 11 former Soviet or Soviet-satellite states joined the European
Union, 7 joined NATO, and Georgia and Ukraine were promised NATO
membership.22 From a national security perspective, the war in 2008 may
have been inevitable, but it was also an opportunity for the determined
Russia to stop oppositional expansion: the territorial integrity of the
frozen space and the safety of Russian citizens could serve as a pretext
for action.23 Russia has strayed from flagrant violations of international
law that might see it on the receiving end of a UN-sanctioned regime
change. Thus, Russia operates within the Kremlin’s interpretation
of international norms, such as the responsibility to protect, which it
applied to the Russian citizens of South Ossetia.24 By freezing South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and enshrining itself as their protector, Russia
was granted a free hand to intervene in an area it considers part of its
strategic interests.
The 2008 conflict started as the result of a security dilemma. But its
outcome was due to a Russian strategy of manipulating frozen conflicts to
achieve foreign policy objectives. Like Moldova, Georgia possessed the
necessary preconditions for creating a frozen conflict. Unlike Moldova,
Russia recognized these preconditions and then set out to exploit them.
In this, it was undoubtedly successful beyond the Kremlin’s expectations.
In just five days of campaigning, Russia secured its protectorate states
and ended NATO expansion. More importantly, the victory heralded a
new era of Russian revisionism and Western hegemonic decay. These
factors would eventually lead Russia to target the other country that
was promised NATO membership at the Bucharest summit: Ukraine.
In this new theater, the Kremlin would actively foment the necessary
preconditions for creating a frozen conflict. What started as an accident
in Moldova and evolved into an opportunity in Georgia would culminate
as dedicated strategy in Ukraine.
20      Nona Mikhelidze, “After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus
and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution” (background paper, The Caucasus
and Black Sea Region: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Beyond conference, Rome,
February 6–7, 2009), 2.
21      Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace,’ ”
International Affairs 84, no. 6 (November 2008): 1147.
22      Allison, “Russia Resurgent,” 1165.
23      Allison, “Russia Resurgent,” 1146.
24      Allison, “Russia Resurgent,” 1151–52.
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Donbas, Ukraine

Compared to the examples above, the Crimea is not frozen. The
UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the international community “not to recognize any alteration of the status of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea.” 25 Although Russia was viewed as
a peacekeeper in Moldova and Georgia, it has been overtly described
as an occupier in Crimea. Of greater interest in the context of this
article is the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Donbas, which represent
Russia’s understanding of frozen conflicts as part of strategy. In 2007,
the European Union offered Ukraine an association agreement. This
agreement “remained on the table throughout 2013, even as Kyiv failed
to meet key, public EU demands for political reform.” 26 Indeed, the
European Union also recognized Ukraine’s strategic importance. With
EU and NATO prospects looming, the Euromaidan demonstrations
necessitated greater Russian involvement in the region to address its
security concerns.
Ukraine boasted the key ingredients needed for a frozen conflict: an
ethnic minority “large enough to hope for their own statehood,” separatist sentiment, societal divisions, and Russia as the external actor.27 These
circumstances had thus far been muted through democratic processes,
a tradition of peaceful power sharing and turnover, and the election
of the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.28 Through a mixture
of Russian pressure and promises, Yanukovych abruptly cancelled the
implementation of the EU-Ukraine association agreement. This action
led to the 2013 student protests, which the Yanukovych government
responded to with force, thereby sparking Euromaidan. The revolution
violently ousted Yanukovych in favor of a pro-EU government. Although
governments are sometimes excused, at least marginally, for their use
of force against protestors under the notion of “keeping the peace,”
the violent ousting of an elected government official in Ukraine was
something new. Just as Sulla’s march on Rome shattered the mos maiorum
of Roman politics, so too had the “flagrant use of force by protesters
with the tacit support of opposition parties removed the major constraint
that had previously kept the political struggle in Ukraine peaceful.” 29
Militias in the Donbas were formed to protect locals from a perceived
ultranationalist threat, a concept bellowed loudly by Russian television
that described Euromaidan as a fascist takeover. These militias were
quickly buttressed by Cossacks, Russian “volunteers,” and Russian
sympathizers within the Ukrainian armed forces.
To crush the insurgency in its infancy, Ukraine targeted a militia
group, led by former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Strelkov,
that had taken over the key city of Slavyansk.30 Generously described
as incompetent, the Ukrainian recapture of Slavyansk took over two
months. In that time, Donetsk and Luhansk declared their independence
25      UN General Assembly, Resolution 68/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, A/RES/68/262
(March 27, 2014), 2.
26      Paul Kubicek, “Dancing with the Devil: Explaining the European Union’s Engagement with
Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 25, no. 2 (2017): 144–45.
27      Arbatova, “Frozen Conflicts,” 51.
28      Serhiy Kudelia, “The Donbas Rift,” Russian Social Science Review 58, no. 2–3 (2017): 212–34.
29      Kudelia, “Donbas Rift,” 216.
30      Kudelia, “Donbas Rift,” 221.
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and fortified their positions. The insurgency also had the time it needed
to achieve military parity: “By the middle of July, the militia moved
from guerrilla raids and infantry battles to tank battles and remote duels
using rocket artillery” with Russian assistance.31 Despite this setback,
by the end of the summer campaign, Ukraine was on the offensive.
As in Moldova and Georgia, Russian troops directly intervened to stop
the separatist governments from being overrun. Thus in the battle for
Ilovaisk, Ukrainian state forces were soundly defeated.32
Early in the Donbas unrest, Russia initiated talks toward a
resolution that would allow Donetsk and Luhansk “to choose their own
government, legislative authorities and governors” as well as manage
their economic affairs.33 This solution, a semiautonomous Donbas
acting as a buffer zone, was the best Russia could imagine. If the region
could not achieve semiautonomy, Russia was prepared to freeze the
conflict with a cease-fire agreement. In these negotiations, the United
States, United Kingdom, and France consistently rejected proposals of
limited sovereignty in the Donbas.34 Russia thus turned to the frozen
state and successfully achieved a cease-fire agreement in 2014. Russia
could have exploited this frozen conflict for decades, but Russian-backed
separatists crossed the cease-fire line and launched the Debaltseve
offensive. Pursuing objectives such as cities, industrial centers, and
airports “showed the extent to which Moscow was willing to support
the opposition in gaining its strategic objectives, even justifying these
military operations at the UN as self-defense.” 35 By applying the lessons
learned by the Abkhazian breaking of the cease-fire in Georgia, Moscow
attempted to shift the cease-fire line and establish a more strategic
position before letting the freeze set in.
Given the dearth of territorial exchanges after the Debaltseve
offensive, some have described the Donbas as frozen, but the
characteristics are far more violent than those associated with
Transdniestria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.36 Numerous cease-fires—
such as the Easter cease-fire on March 30, 2018, which failed on its first
day—have been implemented and violated by both parties, suggesting
two key developments. First, Ukraine and the West are more aggressive
and determined to blunt Russian aspirations. Second, Russia has either
not achieved the strategic positioning it desires or it has lost control
over the actions of its separatists. Thus, a more accurate analysis would
categorize the Donbas and Ukraine as being in a low intensity civil war.
In Moldova and Georgia, Russia acted openly and without Western
interference, thus allowing it to use all military measures available
to achieve a quick victory and to dictate the terms of any cease-fire
agreements. In the Donbas, Russia is facing Western military and
political support for the Ukrainian government. Because of this,
Ukraine does not need to negotiate with Russia on its own nor negotiate
31      Kudelia, “Donbas Rift,” 226.
32      Jamie Dettmer, “Should the U.S. Arm Ukraine’s Militias?,” Daily Beast, November 24, 2014.
33      Sergey Lavrov (Russian Foreign Minister), interview with Voskresnoye vremya, Moscow, March
30, 2014.
34      Lance Davies, “Russia’s ‘Governance’ Approach: Intervention and the Conflict in the
Donbas,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (2016): 735.
35      Davies, “Russia’s ‘Governance’ Approach,” 742.
36      Maria Tsvetkova, “Ceasefire Brings Limited Respite for East Ukrainians,” Reuters, July
21, 2015.
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from a disadvantageous position. The increased Western involvement
has invited more Western scrutiny, condemnation, and reprisals in the
form of economic sanctions. Furthermore, if Moscow is perceived to
invade Ukraine openly, the West may have justification for not only
intervening to remove Russian forces but also to extend the intervention
to Moscow itself. These conditions force Putin to operate on a level of
official deniability, however dubious, to deny the West a casus belli. This
“doctrine of deniability” was at first advantageous to allowing Moscow
to support separatist movements covertly. Since Russia has been forced
to remain at this level, however, they have been unable to exercise
the authority necessary to keep the movements both effective for and
subservient to the Kremlin’s aspirations.
Given these considerations, one can say Putin’s attempt to strategize
a frozen conflict in Ukraine has been a success, but the outcome of
that strategy has been a failure. Regardless, Russia has clearly learned
from its experiences in Georgia and Moldova to lay the groundwork
for intervention and to create the conditions for a frozen conflict
early. Russian television focused on the violent far right elements of
Euromaidan, decried supposed human rights violations against ethnic
Russians, provided operational support to catalyze and to sustain
resistance movements, and recognized the breakaway regions as cultural
identities separate from Kiev. The scenario demonstrates the separatist
movements are not under the purview of Russian authorities.
Strelkov, the former FSB officer who took over Slavyansk, likely
went beyond any mandate he might have received from Moscow. He had
expected Russian forces to drive into the Donbas, as they had in Crimea
once the independence referendum was carried out, but Moscow refused
to even recognize the vote as legitimate.37 In negotiations to end the
conflict or to implement cease-fires, Russia has proved unable to control
the separatism it fomented. Recognizing this shortcoming, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, “We shouldn’t pretend that those
people (opposition) will readily obey. They live on their land, and they
are fighting for it.” 38 Russia used separatism to create chaos in a space
that could then be exploited. But this paradoxically left the separatists
prone to acting outside Russian interests.
The Donbas scenario proves that while Moscow’s understanding
of frozen conflicts has evolved, so too has the West’s, which has been
employed to curb Russian ambitions. Russia is therefore presented with
four options moving forward. First, it can aim for a frozen status akin
to Transdniestria-Moldova. Second, it can withdraw from the Donbas
and allow Ukrainian state forces to resume control either totally or as
part of a power-sharing agreement. Third, it can recognize or annex the
Donbas and gamble that the West will not respond. Finally, it can choose
to sustain the low intensity civil war and find uses for it such as staging
false-flag attacks to increase domestic support or by using the conflict
space as a testing ground for military technology.
Putin will likely pursue the first direction. Freezing the Donbas
would benefit Russia’s economic and geopolitical circumstances far
more than the other options. But Russia seems willing to maintain the
37      Kudelia, “Donbas Rift,” 221.
38      Sergey Lavrov (speech, 51st Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 7, 2015).
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low intensity civil war until that goal is accomplished. A low intensity
civil war provides opportunity for political exploitation and military
development; critically, it allows for Russia to remain prepared should
an opportunity to freeze the conflict present itself, thus finally achieving
the desired end state.

Policy Recommendations

The West has made great strides in combating Russian exploitation of
frozen conflicts by refusing to negotiate peace agreements that recognize
the autonomy of the Donbas regions and by refusing cease-fires where
Russia acts as the primary peacekeeper. Western sanctions need to be
upheld and strengthened, including the implementation of America’s
secondary sanctions on companies that do business with Russian firms.
Any new peace agreement should include measures acknowledging
Ukraine as the sole government and authority within its state borders,
and any cease-fire agreements should preclude Russian peace enforcers.
For Ukraine, the tradition of peaceful political struggle destroyed
in 2014 needs to be reestablished, along with the monopoly on violence
that Ukraine once enjoyed over its society. Ukraine should undergo a
renewed campaign to remove the governments in Donetsk and Luhansk
by seizing or destroying the separatists’ buildings and infrastructure. The
airs of legitimacy for the “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, which
give it leverage over peace negotiations, must be eliminated. Further,
the fact that Russia does not retain control over the militias opens an
opportunity for their corruption. Ukraine should focus on pliable militia
leaders who may be bribed with payments and government posts as well
as former militia members who can be incorporated into state forces.
To help address the lack of economic opportunity in the Donbas,
Ukraine should make and fulfill pledges for greater economic investment
in the region with Western assistance if needed. Ukraine should repeal
the language law implemented in 2017, which banned teaching minority
languages in schools; increase the representation of ethnic Russians
throughout the government; marginalize far-right movements; and
acknowledge the violence of the Euromaidan demonstrations to include
taking steps towards reparations for destroyed property and loss of life.
If the West determines that supporting Ukraine—and its reclamation
of the Donbas—against Russia are security priorities, then the key
recommendation is to take a more aggressive stance. The West should
increase its involvement in the Donbas, including the engagement of
private military contractors in a train, advise, and assist capacity that
reduces exposure. Weapon deliveries to Ukraine should increase so state
forces have a qualitative edge over the opposition. Russia’s response to
this support would likely result in increased support for the separatist
forces, but operating on a level of deniability limits the types and
quantity of assets—such as drones, conventional air strikes, and standoff
weapons—that can be engaged.
By intervening at the behest of the sovereign Ukrainian government,
the West has the advantage of bringing those forces to bear. Should such
an action occur, Russia will be forced either to remain at a lower level of
engagement than the West or to confront Western assets directly. Russia
would likely be unwilling to risk a direct confrontation with NATO and
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opt to remain at a lower level of engagement to maintain deniability. As
long as the West remains more engaged than Russia, Ukraine should
emerge with an advantageous position in settlement negotiations.
Russia’s history with frozen conflicts reveals preventative measures
post-Soviet states may take to reduce or to degrade Russia’s ability to
foment separatism and conflict. Russia strives to widen the identity rift
between native and Russian populations by funding cultural centers,
summer camps, and language academies. Vulnerable states such as
Estonia and Latvia attempted to counter these efforts by implementing
language laws akin to those found in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
Understanding how these laws encourage separatism, vulnerable states
should repeal these mandates. Collaborations with regional partners
should invest in native cultural programs that encourage Russian
populations to assume a shared identity. The United States similarly
promotes shared identities among its ethnic populations by celebrating
holidays such as Cinco de Mayo and the Chinese New Year despite
neither being official government holidays.
According to political anthropologists, Baltic states can successfully
assimilate Russian populations not by forcing them to become Estonian,
Latvian, or Lithuanian but by acknowledging Russian ethnicity as a
legitimate subdivision of the native culture.39 In Estonia and Latvia,
ethnic Russians make up approximately 26 and 30 percent of the total
population, respectively. Marginalizing Russia as a primary language,
removing Soviet monuments, maligning Russian media (which may be
the only understandable outlet), and diminishing ethnic holidays only
gives just cause to claims of Russophobia. Denying the Russians minority
of legitimacy as stakeholders in the native society creates a schism that
is more susceptible to overtures of Russian ultranationalism. Thus by
investing in a stronger national identity and state character among
the population of ethnic Russians, the Baltic will be less vulnerable to
Russian influence.
Media plays an important role in deterring Russian aggression
against post-Soviet states. The relative ignorance of the international
community made previous Russian efforts more effective. Russia had
frozen Moldova, humbled Georgia, and annexed Crimea before NATO
states even knew there was a conflict. Increased media and international
attention has helped stifle Russia’s efforts in the Donbas by keeping
the conflict relevant to Western voters and their representatives. Thus,
post-Soviet states should keep diplomatic, political, and military
confrontations with Russia as public as possible. This is not to say an
alarm should sound every time Russia violates Lithuania’s airspace, but
it does mean a narrative of Russian aggression should be propagated to
deprive Russia control over the narrative if a separatist conflict breaks
out. Such a deterrent would reduce Russia’s political capital and make its
direct support of separatism less likely.
The Baltic states should be commended for integrating with NATO
and the European Union. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania successfully
petitioned for an increased NATO troop presence, and Estonia expanded
NATO infrastructure that included the Cooperative Cyber Defence
39      Durukan Kuzu, “Comparative Analysis of Political Systems and Ethnic Mobilization:
Assimilation versus Exclusion,” Comparative European Politics 15, no. 4 (June 2017): 567–68.
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Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. More can be done to strengthen the
effectiveness of this deterrent force, however. Baltic states should
advocate for a legal framework within NATO regarding allied troops
responding to separatist forces supported by adversarial nations without
triggering Article 5 since Russia is far less likely to employ “little green
men” and GRU operatives directly against NATO forces, which would
degrade the sustainability of a separatist force.
Not all separatist movements are the result of nefarious directives
emanating from the Kremlin, however. Vulnerable states should therefore
adopt a doctrine of maximum response to any armed movement. Such
a strategy raises the commitment necessary for supplying and sustaining
separatist militias. If the Kremlin does not believe it will achieve a
quick, legitimate, or effective political victory at a reasonable cost, it
will be far less likely to support such movements. Although the tactic
failed in Ukraine, the strategy to crush the assumed center of resistance
in Slavyansk was correct. Where Ukraine erred was in the execution,
which provided time for Donetsk and Luhansk to fortify their positions.
Post-Soviet states should create contingency plans for seizing vulnerable
towns, government buildings, and infrastructure that might lend a
separatist movement legitimacy. These plans should involve the greatest
qualitative and quantitative assets available. Should an armed separatist
movement break out, Russia should be faced with a quagmire rather
than an opportunity.

Conclusion

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Crimea, and Donbas
represent an evolution of Moscow’s understanding of frozen conflicts.
What started as an accidental development eventually matured into
an opportunity to be exploited and culminated into strategy. Frozen
conflicts have thus far allowed Russia to achieve its revisionist goals
while staying free of Western military response. Russia dominated the
frozen space for so long because it was the only superpower willing
to operate within it. Post-Crimea, however, the West has started to
challenge Russia on this front. Still, the West can do more to degrade
Russia’s advantage in the frozen conflict space further and to formulate
preemptive measures. Such efforts will become increasingly important
as Russia takes aim at other vulnerable states who have the necessary
preconditions for separatism present in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

